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1. Introduction
The debit card is a new payment device providing access to
funds deposited in a bank account. Having grown out of the paper
based credit card, it developed primarily in the course of evolution
of electronic funds transfer ("EFT") systems. This article purports
to examine the elements of the EFT debit card transaction and
explore the legal regime governing it.
Part 2 sets out the fundamentals of the EFT debit card as a
device facilitating electronic access to funds so as to initiate
payment from terminals at points of sale ("POS") and automated
banking machines ("ABMs"). Part 3 delineates the setting within
• Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. ©Benjamin Geva 1989. This
article is part of a study on the allocation of risks in payment mechanisms supported by a
grant from the Foundation of Legal Research of the Canadian Bar Association. Much of
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their colleagues at the Canadian Payments Association; Catherine Irwin and M.B.
Anderson of the Bank of Montreal; Norman Cromie of the C.I.B.C.; S.R. Morran of the
TD Bank; Richard Crooker of Amex Canada; D.A. Fry of Interac Association; Marie T.
Ibell of Hudson's Bay; David Bruce and his colleagues at the National Australia Bank;
staff of the Australian Trade Practices Commission; D. McCallum of EFT-POS Devel-
opment in the United Kingdom; Richard Field, Leslie Wollin and James Bauer of
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which the EFT debit card transaction takes place. It thus outlines
the various system components, such as terminals, computers,
telecommunication links, and clearing and settlement. Part 4
investigates the legal issues arising in the course of transactions
whose elements have been explored in the previous parts. It thus
considers the relative position of retailers, consumers, and depos-
itary financial institutions in EFT debit card transactions. The
article concludes with some observations as to the proper avenue
for the future development of debit card law and the role of the
Canadian Payments Association in that process.
In Canada, as elsewhere, the law governing the EFT debit card
is in its early evolutionary stage. This article is designed to assist in
setting a direction and providing a framework for its development.
It is written primarily, though not exclusively, from a Canadian
perspective.
2. Cards, PINs and Access to Funds
Plastic cards bearing information as to cardholder, card
number, and card issuer, issued to customers by depositary
financial institutions such as banks' ("payment cards") are not a
novelty in consumer payment systems. For several decades now,
payment cards have been used in various ways. First, a card may
be used solely as a means of verifying the identity of the payer to
the payee's satisfaction, so as to assist the latter in assessing the
authenticity of the former's payment instructions. Secondly, a
payment card may be used to give the payee the issuer's authori-
zation to accept the card. Such an authorization may provide the
payee with the issuer's assurance either of payment, or at least, as
to the payer's identity, that is, as to the authenticity of his payment
instructions. Finally, a card can access funds and initiate payment
itself.
In the course of their development, payment cards have fallen
into several categories. A card providing an assurance of payment
of a cheque is a cheque guaranty card. A card providing an
assurance of payment to a merchant accepting the card under an
I Two caveats ought to be noted. First, payment cards may also be issued by nondepositary
financial institutions such as retailers. Second, depositary financial institutions include
chartered banks, trust companies, and co-operative credit societies. In this article they are
all treated as "banks". This is modelled on the statutory definition of bank in s. 164 of the
Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4.
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agreement with the issuer or with the merchant's bank is a credit
card. A card facilitating access to funds in the cardholder's deposit
account is a debit card. Finally, a card initiating payment, that is,
facilitating access to funds in the cardholder's account solely on
the basis of information communicated electronically, is an EFT
debit card. The list may not be exhaustive. Nevertheless, it covers
the main stages of the development of the payment card.
Depending on available technology and pertinent use, payment
cards have emerged in different forms. In general, three genera-
tions of cards have surfaced: the "mere plastic" or embossed card,
the magnetic-stripe card, and the "smart" or memory card.
2
The information contained in the first generation cards can be
obtained solely by a physical examination of the card. This inform-
ation can be copied by the payee on the piece of paper containing
the paying cardholder's payment instructions, usually a cheque.
The task of manual copying can be avoided where the "mere
plastic" card is embossed. The embossed card has raised
characters on its surface. These characters can be reproduced on
paper when the card is run through an imprinter which is used to
manually print the information appearing on the face of the card.
Embossed cards have primarily been used as credit cards where
the information contained on the card is imprinted on the sales
draft embodying the cardholder's payment instructions.
First generation cards contain the cardholder's signature for
cross-verification with the signature on the cheque or sales draft.
These cards have been used either solely as identification cards, to
verify the identity of the paying cardholder or, more often, as a
means of giving the payee an assurance of payment. The cheque
guaranty card as well as the credit card are cards giving such
assurance of payment. As explained below, the outgrowth of the
first generation credit card and its development to meet current
functional needs by taking advantage of new technologies,
underlies the evolution of the second and third generation cards
within which the EFT debit card has evolved.
To benefit from the assurance of payment in credit card transac-
tions, the payee-merchant is typically required by contract 3 to
2 See, in general, D. Martres, "Le Smart Card" (1989), 96 Canadian Banker 1:26 (in
English). For a more comprehensive treatment, see D. Chorafas, Electronic Funds
Transfer (London, Butterworth & Co. Ltd., 1988), primarily Chapter 22.
3 The contractual setting, in the context of the legal framework for bank credit cards in
Canada, is described in S. Goldstein, Changing Times: Banking in the Electronic Age
(Ottawa, Government of Canada, 1979), Chapter VI.
[Vol. 15
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verify whether or not the particular card is in the current list of
misused cards. Such lists are distributed periodically to retailers.
Futhermore, for a large payment, the merchant is required to
obtain the issuer's prior authorization to accept the card. The
issuer's authorization will be given where payment is within the
cardholder's existing credit limits and the card is not among the
misused cards.
The request for authorization is made by the payee communi-
cating the card information to the issuer. Authorization can be
requested and obtained by phone. Originally, the merchant
seeking to accept a credit card payment was required to call the
card issuer directly. The system was improved when communi-
cation between the merchant and each issuer could be interme-
diated through the authorization centre of the merchant's own
bank. This design saves time by enabling the merchant to call his
own bank regardless of who the issuer of the card is.
Requiring authorization for each credit card payment, and not
only for high value transactions, would eliminate the need to
distribute lists of misused cards. It would also eliminate situations
where credit limits of a cardholder are exceeded due to a series of
low value transactions. Expediting the authorization process has
thus become important, and not only in connection with large
payments.
The need for a faster authorization process was met by the
magnetic-stripe card. This is the second stage in the evolution of
payment cards. The magnetic stripe is a technological device by
which pre-recorded information is stored on a card. Magnetic
stripes containing card information are inexpensive and have been
placed on first generation cards. When a magnetic-stripe card is
passed ("swiped") by the payee-merchant through a terminal at
the point of sale, the information stored in the magnetic stripe is
"read" and communicated directly to the merchant's bank author-
ization centre without the need of further human intervention
such as a phone call. Where the issuer and the merchant's bank are
different institutions, the request for authorization is directed by
the latter to the former. Authorization is communicated back
from the issuer, via the merchant's bank where it is a separate
institution, to the point-of-sale terminal. This allows the merchant
to proceed and to accept the card payment. In this process, the
magnetic-stripe card initiates the online electronic authorization.
Electronic authorization is the forerunner of the electronic
1989]
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deposit of funds. The deposit occurs when the data from the card
transaction, which has been communicated from the terminal at
the point of sale, can be captured at the receiving end. Online data
capture facilitates the giving of credit to the payee-merchant
account.
4
Also, in theory, the cardholder's account could have been
debited at this stage. Nevertheless, the move to direct debit has
been fraught with difficulties. Sound banking practices require
that no account be debited unless the authenticity of the paying
customer's instructions can be established to the satisfaction of the
bank maintaining the account ("account holder"). This is because
a successful challenge by the customer to a debit in his account
requires the account holder to reverse the debit. 5 A successful
challenge can further expose the account holder to liability for
consequential loss, which can be substantial, where the wrongful
debit left the account with insufficient funds to meet valid payment
instructions that consequently were dishonoured.
6
Because of these difficulties, the account holder is well justified
in requiring unambiguous proof supporting payment instructions.
An internal system verifying the authenticity of each payment
request may prevent a wrongful debit and the resulting wrongful
dishonour. As well, the retention of evidence authenticating
payment instructions enables the account holder to meet a
customer's challenge as to that authenticity. This is also true
where, for business reasons, individual verification prior to
payment of each request is unworkable. Under such circum-
stances, the account holder assumes the risk of subsequent
wrongful dishonour, but is able to protect itself against unfounded
allegations by the customer of lack of authenticity of payment
instructions.
Data captured in the course of the electronic authorization of a
credit card transaction falls short of allowing an account holder to
4 The evolution from electronic authorization to electronic deposit, and the subsequent
move to direct debit, are set out in POS in Canada, a report prepared by American
Express Canada, Inc. (April, 1985).
5 In principle (though subject to available defences) a paying bank cannot debit its
customer's account where payment was made without mandate from the customer and
was not ratified. For this principle, see, e.g., Barclays Bank Ltd. v. W.J. Simms Son &
Cooke (Southern) Ltd., [1980] Q.B. 677 at p. 699,perGoffJ.
6 Liability for wrongful dishonour is discussed in B. Crawford, Crawford and Falconbridge
Banking and Bills of Exchange, 8th ed. (Toronto, Canada Law Book Inc., 1986), Vol. 1,
§3901.4.
(Vol. 15
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access the cardholder's account. Such a process fails to produce
evidence which is capable of convincing the account holder of the
authenticity of the payment instructions. Only the use of the card,
but not its user's identity, is verified. True, a successful challenge
by the customer as to the authenticity of the payment instructions
undermines the validity of the electronic deposit of funds to the
payee-merchant's account. However, the contractual
arrangement between the merchant and his bank is likely to allow
the latter to reverse credits made against uncollected funds. In
general, a bank is likely to assume risks generated by such provi-
sional credits. 7 It does not follow that it is willing and ready to
assume the risk of unauthorized debits.
In a credit card system, funds are credited to the merchant's
account on the basis of a deposit of sales drafts, by the delivery of
tapes (on which payments are recorded), or by electronic deposit.
Funds are paid to the bank for deposit by the card issuer. In the
course of this process, the cardholder's credit card account is
debited by the card issuer without the issuer being satisfied with
the authenticity of the payment instructions. However, no
cardholder's funds at his current account are accessed throughout
this process. Access is made subsequently and solely on the basis
of the cardholder's own confirmation made by the act of payment
for items charged to his credit account and billed to him periodi-
cally. Where a dispute arises as to an item charged, the existence
of a validly signed sales draft will determine its resolution. It is the
signed piece of paper8 which entitles the account holder to proceed
against the cardholder.
In fact, there are card systems where the cardholder's funds are
accessed on the basis of the electronic deposit generated in the
7 Indeed, the cheque collection system is premised on a provisional credit being given to the
depositor which may be revoked upon the subsequent dishonour and return of the
cheque. See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. Sharp (1975), 57 D.L.R. (3d) 260, [197516
W.W.R. 97 (B.C.C.A.).
8 Two qualifications ought to be noted. First, in a telephone credit card payment the sales
draft is generated by the merchant according to the authority given by the buyer. Needless
to say, this may produce additional evidentiary problems as to authority and content of
payment instructions. Second, in practice, a card issuer may devise a scheme where no
signed piece of paper is required and charges to the cardholder's charge account are made
on the basis of running the card at the point of sale alone. It must be recognized however
that under such a scheme an issuer faced with an unauthorized use plea runs an eviden-
tiary risk. By contractual means these risks may be shifted to the merchant or his bank. No
bank runs such a scheme. One such scheme is operated in Canada by an oil company
where the value of each sale is relatively low.
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course of the online authorization. The sales draft is kept
("truncated") 9 by the merchant at the point of sale. It will be
retrieved only upon a challenge by the cardholder as to the
pertinent charge in his account. In this environment, the payment
card has facilitated access to funds and turned the credit card into a
debit card. None the less, the authentication of the payment
instructions remains dependent on the signature verification. As a
result, this is a paper-based and not an EFT debit card.
The operation of such a paper-based debit card system is not
free of controversy. First, the practice of accessing the
cardholder's funds prior to the issuer having an opportunity to
satisfy itself as to the authenticity of the payment instructions
exposes the account holder to the risk of an unauthorized debit
leading to a wrongful dishonour. 10 As for proving the authenticity
of the payment instructions on the basis of the signed sales draft,
there may also be the practical difficulty of retrieving the sales
draft from a remote merchant dealing with a remote foreign bank.
Second, where a blank authorization is sought in advance for an
open-ended obligation, such as a car rental or hotel bill, funds may
be frozen in the cardholder's account on the basis of the online
authorization. It is not entirely clear whether the online authori-
zation may then be treated as the equivalent of cheque
certification' so that the frozen funds may be withdrawn from the
cardholder's account prior to the crystallization of the payment
obligation. This would permit the account holder to dishonour
cheques and other payment items competing for the same funds
and striking the account prior to the completion of the transaction.
These uncertainties have led to the demise of the paper-based
debit card in Canada. 12
9 For "truncation" in the cheque collection system see B. Geva, "Off-Premises
Presentment and Cheque Truncation Under the Bills of Exchange Act" (1986-87), 1
B.F.L.R. 295, particularly at pp. 296-302.
10 See the discussion around footnote 6, supra. In theory, the solution to this particular
problem lies in the replication of the cheque collection system, under which no account is
debited until there is an opportunity to verify the signature on the pertaining cheque. For
cheque clearing see, e.g., Geva, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 303-5 and 317. This may
however defeat the objectives of curtailing paper movement and eliminating the float.
11 For cheque certification and the withdrawal funds payable under a certified cheque see
B. Geva, "Irrevocability of Bank Drafts, Certified Cheques and Money Orders" (1986),
65 Can. Bar Rev. 107, at pp. 123-30.
12 This is in contrast to the United States where Master Debit and Visa Debit have been set
as such paper-based debit card systems. In Canada, Master Card II, the predecessor of
Master Debit, has not gained momentum.
[Vol. 15
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Direct debit to the cardholder's account on the basis of data
captured in the course of electronic authorization is feasible where
such data serves also to verify the cardholder's identity so as to
authenticate his payment instructions. Stated otherwise, an "elec-
tronic signature" must be communicated to the account holder
from the terminal at the point of sale.
The Personal Identification Number ("PIN") was devised to
serve as such an electronic signature. This is a relatively low cost
electronic means of customer identification in the form of a secret
code, intended for the sole use of each cardholder, and designed
to authenticate his instructions given at a terminal. 13 Since the
stripe can be easily read with a very cheap device, no PIN inform-
ation is stored in it. Rather, information used to derive the PIN is
stored in the magnetic stripe and "read" when the card is inserted
at the terminal. This information and the secret number entered
by the cardholder at the terminal are used by the card issuer, using
an algorithm, to verify the PIN. This verifies the identity of the
cardholder 14 and authenticates his instructions. The audit trail
provides proof of the exercise. This allows the account holder to
access the cardholder's account and debit it in the course of the
electronic authorization process. 15 Thus, the addition of the
information, from which the PIN can be derived, to the data
stored on the magnetic stripe, underlies the transformation of the
paper-based payment card to the EFT debit card. 16
EFT debit cards originated in cash disbursement transactions at
cash dispensers. 17 A terminal, usually unattended, that issues cash
to a cardholder is a cash dispenser.18 On the basis of PIN verifi-
cation followed by an authorization, and in response to a
13 For a definition of PIN and a brief explanation see, e.g., two recent reports (collectively
referred to below as "POS documents") of the Canadian Payments Association: (1) The
Fundamental Elements of EFT/POS - Revised and Recommended Version (September
23, 1988), p. 7 ; and (2) The EFT/POS Consultative Process: A Status Report (October 12,
1988), p. 6. Respectively these reports are to be referred to below as "EFTPOS Funda-
mentals" and "EFTPOS Consultative Process".
14 Strictly speaking this is card authentication more than cardholder identification except
that both are performed on the basis of the card.
15 See, e.g., Chorafas, supra, footnote 2, at pp. 181, 186, 195 and 203.
16 For other uses of PIN technology in cheque authorization and guarantee systems, see N.
Penney and D.I. Baker, The Law of Electronic Fund Transfer Systems (Boston, New
York, Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1980, with a 1987 Cum. Sup. by D. I. Baker and R.E.
Brandel), Chapter 8. No such systems are in place in Canada.
17 See, e.g., Chorafas, supra, footnote 2, at pp. 339-41.
18 Goldstein, supra, footnote 3, at p. 167.
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cardholder's request made at the terminal and communicated to
the issuer's host computer, cash stored at the dispenser is released
to the cardholder and his account is debited. Under such circum-
stances, the PIN controlled verification process is the only proof of
the authenticity of the cardholder's disbursement request. As
corresponding needs arose in retail transactions, and large
numbers of retailers and banks joined a programme, the same
machinery was put to work at point-of-sale terminals.
Whether in cash disbursement or point-of-sale transactions, an
EFT debit card environment is characterized by the account
holder's reliance on information communicated by electronic
means as establishing the cardholder's payment instructions. This
information is communicated in the course of the verification/au-
thorization process. However, it does not follow that such inform-
ation must be acted upon promptly. That is, the ability to access
funds need not translate itself into immediate debit or even credit.
Accounts may be updated daily, whether with respect to that day
or a previous day, 19 at set times during the day, or instantaneously.
As well, the respective debit and credit stemming from each
payment need not be triggered simultaneously. A debit card
payment is thus characterized by the initiation of payment by
means of the electronic communication of card information.
Indeed, online communication of card information may facilitate
realtime payment from end to end so as to assimilate the card
payment to cash payment. However, slower payment scenarios
are also consistent with the notion of a debit card payment.
Nor is online verification/authorization an indispensable
component of an EFT debit card transaction. Regardless of the
timing of the account adjustment, the online authorization
communicated by the card issuer to the terminal constitutes its
assurance of payment, as in a credit card transaction. However,
there may be incentives to bypass the online verification/authori-
zation process. This may be done either to reduce costs or to
control retail data and maintain cardholder base where a nonbank
card issuer is prepared to assume risks eliminated by the bank's
online verification/authorization. 20 In principle, there is no such
19 In the United Kingdom "[alt present there is a delay, of up to four days, which is the
notional equivalent of the time it takes to clear a cheque". See D. Barchard, "The debit
card becomes a success story", The Financial Times, December 31, 1988. Obviously this
is done for marketing purposes.
20 Cf. models reviewed in EFTPOS Consultative Process, supra, footnote 13, at pp. 9-14 as
[Vol. 15
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third party at a cash disbursement transaction at a cash dispenser.
Hence, the elimination or replacement of the verification/authori-
zation process will be considered only in connection with terminals
at points of sale. It will be demonstrated that alternative proce-
dures are available, although at a cost and risk which make them
unappealing.
Thus, the online verification/authorization process consists of
two distinct components: card authentication ("verification") and
payment assurance ("authorization"). The process involves an
interactive communication between the terminal and the bank's
host computer. Where this interactive communication process is
bypassed, messages entered at the terminal may be batched and
forwarded for deposit offline and periodically, usually at the end
of the day, by means of delivery of tapes or by batch transmission.
Collection from the account holder may be made through the bank
of deposit.
Sound banking practices preclude the possibility of bypassing
the verification component. Nor can interactive verification be
replaced by a delayed verification process. Under the latter proce-
dure, the cardholder's request for verification is communicated to
the host computer, not necessarily in realtime, but in any event, is
not acknowledged. The merchant may proceed with the trans-
action at his risk. The authenticity of the payment instructions can
only be confirmed subsequently. Such a procedure is open to
abuse; a dishonest cardholder may be tempted to enter a false PIN
and then deny liability.
As well, the account holder does not expect to gain from a
system premised on online verification unaccompanied by funds
release authorization. Such a system treats the verification and
access to the account as two distinct stages and requires the
management of two separate databases. Consequently it is bound
to produce inefficiencies.
An offline environment can exist where verification is
performed at the terminal, with no online communication to the
bank's host computer. It can also exist where verification is
performed by a nonbank card issuer, such as the retailer himself,
or by a third party.
At-the-terminal verification is facilitated by the use of the third
generation of payment cards, 21 the smart card, known also as the
well as Appendix B (the latter being a position paper of the Retail Council of Canada,
dated July 30, 1986) and Appendix D.
21 For the three generations of payment cards see text at footnote 2, supra.
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memory card. 22 This is a card with a built-in microchip which
carries a wider range of information than a conventional second
generation card with a magnetic stripe. The chip measuring only a
few cubic millimetres stores and processes within the card itself the
data required for many types of transaction. This includes
functions and information that in the case of a magnetic-stripe
card require communication from terminals to a host computer.
The utilization of smart-card technology in points of sale is
premised on local in-the-terminal approval in a semi-online
terminal. That is, PIN verification is performed at the terminal
solely on the basis of information stored in the card and without
further communication to a host computer.
The verification by a nonbank card issuer (such as the retailer or
other third party) can be performed in the context of existing
magnetic-stripe technology by means of interactive communica-
tions between the terminal and a host computer of the nonbank
card issuer. In such an environment, the PIN is provided to the
cardholder and is controlled by the nonbank card issuer which
performs the verification. In practice, a nonbank card issuer may
be less scrupulous than a bank and may forgo PIN verification
altogether. A nonbank verification can thus be performed by
means of ID identification, signature on a sales draft kept at the
point of sale, or by the mere possession of the card. But even when
interactive online verification is performed by the nonbank party,
so far as the account holder is concerned this is an offline
environment since collection is made on the basis of batch
processing via the bank of deposit.
Neither smart-card technology nor nonbank's verification
provides access to the cardholder's account. In an offline environ-
ment, in the absence of the account holder's authorization, the
risk of insufficient funds ("NSF") 23 is borne by the merchant. This
is unless the smart card has been prepaid, or unless as a matter of a
business arrangement, the NSF risk has been assumed by another
participant. No assurance of payment is provided by the account
holder in the course of the communication process.
The implementation of both smart-card technology and
nonbank's verification faces hurdles and is open to several objec-
22 On smart cards (and related topics) see in general, Martres, supra, footnote 2; and
Chorafas, supra, footnote 2, at pp. 343-50.
23 The risk includes the nonexistence as well as the closure of the account.
[Vol. 15
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tions. First, the smart card itself is quite expensive. Further,
prepayment is an unattractive proposition to consumers. Their
aversion is directed to prepayment itself as well as to the attendant
risk of losing a prepaid card. At the same time, the need for
authorization cannot be eliminated except where there is
prepayment or the credit risks are low. Overall, in connection with
consumer payments, smart cards do not appear to present a viable
alternative to second generation magnetic-stripe cards. 24
For its part, a nonbank's verification facilitates access to funds
under a verification process which is outside the account holder's
control. 25 This exposes the account holder to the risk of
unauthorized debit leading to the subsequent wrongful dishonour
of valid payment orders. It further leaves the account holder with
no evidence of its own as to the authenticity of payment
instructions.
26
A nonbank PIN controlled verification may be a possible
enhancement to a credit card system. In such environment,
authenticated card instructions dispense with the need for a signed
sales draft. Online authorization triggers an electronic deposit to
the merchant's account and payment by the nonbank card issuer to
the bank of deposit. No cardholder's funds are accessed in the
course of this process. Payment is made by the cardholder to the
nonbank issuer separately and for items charged to his credit
account and billed to him periodically. 27 No funds are thus
accessed on the basis of the nonbank PIN controlled verification.
Nevertheless, in some U.S. systems, a nonbank PIN controlled
verification facilitates access to cardholder's funds. The account
24 For a pessimistic outlook for the smart card in payment systems, see, e.g., Chorafas,
supra, footnote 2, at pp. 345 and 347. None the less, the smart card's prospects look
brighter in countries where the telecommunication system is inefficient. See L. Rosen-
thal, "Italy's Smart Card Systems: Alternatives to On-line Eftpos", Electronic Payments
International, issue 32, p. 9, May, 1989 (A Lafferty Group Publication).
25 The Canadian Payments Association is opposed to such procedures. See statement of
February 10, 1986, "The Framework for the Evolution of the Payments System", being
Appendix A to EFTPOS Consultative Process, supra, footnote 13.
26 Risks to which the account holder is exposed in the absence of control over verification
are set out in the text around footnotes 5 and 6, supra.
27 Cf.discussion around footnote 8, supra (a paper-based credit card system). A PIN
controlled credit card system may be cost effective only for unattended terminals (such as
for the sale of traveller's cheques) as well as for circumstances where, in the issuer's
judgment, merchant's safekeeping of sales drafts is an unsafe or otherwise unworkable
verification system (cf. discussion which follows footnote 10, supra). An unattended
terminal for traveller's cheques works like a cash dispenser.
14-15 C.B.L.J.
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holder protects itself by means of appropriate contractual provi-
sions designed to insulate itself from any dispute as to the authen-
ticity of the instructions. However, since access to funds is
involved, it is questionable whether entrusting the verification
process to someone other than a regulated depositary financial
institution is in the cardholders' interest.
Furthermore, all offline options are premised on overnight
processing of batched messages. Computerized facilities at bank
data centres are under heavy demand during night hours, when
cheque processing takes place. There is less demand on these facil-
ities during daytime hours. Consequently, an increase in the
nightime and diminished daytime demand on computerized facil-
ities is not consistent with the most efficient use of processing
equipment.
A further difficulty is that in an offline environment procedures
must be set to deal with the return of dishonoured items. Such
procedures are costly and may outweigh any saving realized from
the elimination of an online stage. For all these reasons banks in
Canada tend to disfavour all offline options.
A model allowing retailers to control retail data as well as
maintain their cardholder base while entrusting banks with the
PIN controlled verification is being worked out in Canada. PIN
information is to be stored by the account holder in the magnetic
stripe of a retailer issued card. So far as the payment process is
concerned, the card is to be treated as an EFT bank issued debit
card. Bank controlled online verification/authorization is thus to
be fully exercised.
For the time being, the development of the payment card has
not run its full course. It seems though that the magnetic-stripe
technology holds the key to future large scale developments.
Within this framework, cash disbursements at cash dispensers
must be premised on interactive verification as well as online
authorization. For point-of-sale terminals, online authorization
may be dispensed with. However, for a debit card, such a course
may not be desirable and is disfavoured by banks in Canada.
Indeed, if the objective is to assimilate the card funds transfer to
cash payment, online authorization is to be exercised in point-of-
sale transactions as well.
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3. The Network - Terminals, Computers and Sharing Models
A retail payment system in which the communication and
transfer of value in economic exchange depend wholly, or in large
part, upon electronics is known as a retail EFT system.28 The
public access terminal, known also as an automated banking
machine ("ABM") or automated teller machine ("ATM"), which
includes the cash dispenser ("CD"), 29 and POS equipment, are
two of the "three pillars" of a retail consumer-oriented EFT
system. 30 However, the terminals at the point of origin are only the
tip of the iceberg. The network interconnecting the terminals and
connecting them to the appropriate databases is most important. 31
Typically, a comprehensive system includes a card, a terminal,
communication lines, a switching computer, and databases that
maintain the individual account information. 32 Ideally, such a
retail EFT system may operate in a realtime environment, 33 and in
any event is more than a collection of stand-alone electronic cash
registers .34
ABM and POS terminals are card reading terminal devices.
Except in conjunction with cash registers at large department
stores where the embossed credit card numbers are keyed in by
the clerk at the point of sale, only second and third generation
cards, storing data either in magnetic stripes or as smart cards, and
capable of being used as EFT debit cards, can be activated by such
terminals. In the context of magnetic-stripe technology, each
terminal is connected by telecommunication links to a host
computer facility. A cardholder activates an ABM by inserting the
28 See Chorafas, supra, footnote 2, at p. 237.
29 More accurately, the CD, ATM and ABM are three generations of the public access
terminal. Cf. Chorafas, ibid., at pp. 192-5. In the Canadian terminology, "ABM"
denotes "ATM".
30 Chorafas, ibid., at p. 87. The third pillar is home banking, facilitating communication
from the customer's home. As a rule, third party payments initiated from home proceed
offline, except that the payer's account may be debited online. For a skeptic assessment
on the future of home banking, see Chorafas, ibid., Chapter 15. Home banking has not
taken off in Canada. For a positive outlook, see "The Impact of Home Information
Systems on Canada's Payment System: A Call for Action", a paper by W. Javor of Bell
Canada, May 1989, circulated in the 1989 Conference of the Canadian Payments Associ-
ation (Quebec City, May 29-30, 1989) where (at pp. 5 and 6) the home computer is
expressly analogized to a POS terminal.
31 Chorafas, ibid., at p. 332.
3 2 Ibid., at p. 235.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., at p. 308.
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card into a card entry slot at the terminal. First he enters his PIN.
He then requests the cash withdrawal and selects the account by
pressing appropriate buttons. Ultimately the cardholder enters
the amount of the requested cash disbursement. Withdrawal limits
and designated accounts are provided for in the cardholder agree-
ment. Step by step instructions are displayed on a screen
throughout the entire transaction.
35
A POS terminal is activated by the insertion of the card by the
cardholder followed by the merchant keying in the amount at the
terminal and by the cardholder entering the account number and
the PIN on a PIN pad. This amounts to a request for payment to
the seller's account.
36
In an online environment, a terminal so activated is capable of
communicating with the host computer facility to execute the
request. Terminals may be equipped with processors capable of
performing at-the-terminal verification for cards issued by the
bank operating that particular terminal. Some POS terminals are
incapable of performing this function and the verification is
conducted at a host computer. However, the PIN is always
encrypted at the terminal prior to transmission. Authorization for
requests made at ABM as well as POS terminals is universally
performed at a host computer. In a smart card environment, verifi-
cation is conducted at the terminal; authorization is usually
bypassed, except when it is made at the terminal solely on the basis
of limits stored in the card.
Terminals linked to one or more host computers constitute a
network. Networks are either self-contained or shared. Self-
contained networks are also known as unitary, proprietary, or one
party networks. A more refined thinking currently prevailing in
Europe and the United Kingdom as to POS networks is that of a
"common highway". The concept aims at integrity and flexibility
so as to ensure a high level of integration, facilitate smooth
35 This is a general description, subject to possible variations. See, Goldstein, supra,
footnote 3, at Chapter VII. Other services which can be obtained at an ABM, such as an
online transfer from one account to another, obtaining up-to-date balance information,
as well as initiating payment to designated third parties (usually online as to the payer's
debit but offline as to the payee's credit), are outside the scope of this article. In facili-
tating such services the ABM provides similar services to that of home banking (see
footnote 30, supra).
36 Again, this is a general description, subject to possible variations. See Goldstein, ibid.,
Chapter VIII. The separate PIN pad in a POS terminal is designed to maintain
cardholder's privacy in entering the PIN.
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operation and accommodate a broad range of compatibility
among technologies. This requires the establishment of an agreed
high standard of security and strict adherence to common
technical standards among all participants of the shared network.
Each consists of terminals linked to a host computer and is owned
and operated by one institution only. 37 For the time being, the
POS environment in Canada is characterized by proprietary
networks, mostly operating as pilot projects.
"Sharing" is defined as participation in the use, possession or
enjoyment of a terminal and some portion of the telecommuni-
cation links in common with others. 38 A typical shared
environment is created by the merger of two or more proprietary
networks.
The host computers of participating institutions in a shared
network are connected to each other by telecommunication links
either directly or through a central switching computer so as to
form a network of the host computers. A shared network thus
facilitates the use of a terminal of one institution by the customer
of another institution. The respective networks cease to be
proprietary since the use of terminals and telecommunication
links is shared by all participating institutions. 39
A shared network is characterized by interbank communica-
tion. Where a terminal is linked either directly or through a
controller to the host computer of each of several banks, 4° the
37 Two qualifications ought to be made. First, this definition identifies the ownership and
operation of the host computer with ownership and operation of the system. In fact every
POS network involves the merchants operating the terminals and cannot be exclusively
owned and operated by a bank like ABM networks. However, in most cases, except in
connection with large retailers who own terminals which are used also as cash registers,
terminals are owned by banks. Second, in a POS network the connection between a
terminal operated by a large retailer and the bank host computer may be intermediated
by the retailer's own host computer. This intermediation is irrelevant for our purposes.
38 See two documents issued by the Canadian Payments Association (collectively referred
to hereafter as "CPA ABM documents"): (1) Report on Standards Applicable to
Networks of Shared Automated Teller Machines (June 4, 1986), p. 3 (hereafter "ATM
Report"); and (2) Standards Applicable to Networks of Shared Automated Banking
Machines (March 4,1987), p. 1 (hereafter "ABM Standards Document").
39 In principle, networks can be owned and operated exclusively by retailers or other
nonbanks. In such systems, only periodic inter-institution settlement is made through the
banking system. Cardholders pay either periodically, as in a credit card system, or by
authorizing issuers to access accounts (usually periodically and offline). The only
nonbank ABM network operating in Canada is operated by a large retailer and is
connected to a bank. Most transactions are handled online. In some networks in the
United States some large retailers share equally with banks. To keep the analysis
relatively simple, these variations are excluded from the scope of this article.
40 Possibly through the retailer's own host computer, as indicated in footnote 37 (second
qualification).
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entire design consists of clustered but separate proprietary
networks and is not a shared network. Indeed, in such a setting the
use and enjoyment of a terminal are shared by more than one
bank. Nevertheless, each card transaction does not involve
interbank communication. In a POS system falling into such
design, the merchant operating the terminal maintains an account
with each bank linked to the terminal so that no communication
between the terminal and a bank other than that of the merchant is
involved. In this sense, no portion of the communication links is
possessed, enjoyed or used by one bank in common with others so
that, from a transactional point of view, no shared network exists.
A shared network is delineated by its constituent communi-
cation links. The institutions running the network must abide by a
common set of rules and are referred to as network members. In
general, the host computers of the participating network members
may be linked to each other either through a central switch or, in a
gateway system, by means of direct computer-to-computer
communication.
41
A central switch system is premised on the imposition of
minimum bilateral compatibility requirements between each
participant and the central computer, and on a centralized organi-
zational structure. A gateway architecture requires a higher
degree of multilateral compatibility among all participants, and is
more decentralized in its organization. It is more flexible and more
responsive to technological enhancements. A central switch
system better accommodates an open access policy and is
consistent with a fragmented banking system consisting of
numerous and diverse institutions. At the same time, the gateway
architecture is likely to accommodate a banking system dominated
by a small number of large banks.
42
A variant of the central switch design may offer a direct commu-
nication link between a terminal and a card issuer, 43 via the central
41 This is the same as in large-value computerized payment systems. Thus, the New York-
based CHIPS is a central switch system. The London-based CHAPS is a gateway system.
See B. Geva, "CHIPS Transfer of Funds", [1987] J.I.B.L. 208; and B. Geva, "CHAPS
Transfer of Funds", [1988] Lloyd's Mar. & Com. L.Q. 477.
42 Accordingly, networks in the United States are usually central switch systems, while
networks developed in Canada and Australia are gateway systems. As well, the "present
thinking" in the United Kingdom was reported in 1984 as in effect premised on a gateway
system. See Members of the Bankers' Clearing House, Payment Clearing Systems:
Review of Organization, Membership and Control (London, Banking Information
Service, 1984) (known as "the Child Report"), Appendix 3, at p. 44.
43 But cf. footnote 40, supra. The retailer's own host computer may intermediate.
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switch, without the intermediation of the host computer of the
bank operating the terminal. Such a "direct central switch" design
shortens the terminal-to-issuer's communication. However, in this
design, control of access is given to a third party rather than to the
terminal bank. Since the bank operating the terminal is excluded
from the communication route, neither its right against the card
issuer nor, in a POS payment, the merchant's right against the
bank, is generated in the course of the authorization process. The
establishment of both rights requires further communication to
the bank operating the terminal: from the switch, usually online;
from the terminal, usually in batched messages; or from the card
issuer, by means of a wire or any other mode of communication.
Furthermore, the exclusion of the bank operating the terminal
from the authorization communication route may spell trouble in
case of a transmittal error resulting in an amount communicated to
the bank being different from the amount received earlier at the
terminal. Finally, in the "direct central switch" design, a bank
operating POS terminals does not have immediate access to, or
control over, retail data. Nor does the terminal bank control the
level of service given to the merchant. Consequently, this is not a
popular network architecture among banks.
In a shared environment, there are no direct communication
links between a terminal of one institution and the host computer
of another. Except for in the "direct central switch" design, each
terminal is linked to its own institution's host computer. All insti-
tutions' host computers are linked to each other, whether in a
gateway or central switch system. In the "direct central switch"
design, all terminals are linked to the central switch. The central
switch is linked to host computers of participating institutions.
In a shared system, network architecture may require, at least in
some cases, the intermediation of one or more members in the
communication between two member institutions. A shared
network may further expand to give access to nonmember partici-
pating institutions. Each of them ought to establish its own
individual correspondent relationship linking it to a member
sponsoring it and intermediating between itself and the network.
However, sponsored institutions usually are members since they
have a right to use the trademarked logo of the network. In
general, intermediation is more likely to occur in a gateway system
than in a central switch architecture.
A shared network allows a cardholder of a participating insti-
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tution to use a terminal of any participating institution. However,
it does not follow that every participating institution operates
terminals as well as acts as a card issuer. It is quite common for an
institution to be solely a card issuer.
In a shared environment, network rules provide for clearing and
settlement among participating members. A member sponsoring a
participant clears and settles also for the sponsored institution. As
a rule, each participant settles with its sponsor via a correspondent
account.
The most comprehensive ABM network of shared terminals in
Canada is Interac. 4 It is a "two tiered" gateway system open only
to members of the Canadian Payments Association ("CPA") 45
covering more than 6,000 ABMs from coast to coast. 46 It is
expected that by 1990 Interac will also encompass POS terminals.
Members of the Interac Association are either chartered or
sponsored. 47 Chartered members have developed a system to link
their respective proprietary terminal networks by installing a
switching device at the computer of each institution. The switching
devices act as communication gateways between members'
networks of terminals. Each device receives information from its
own institution's terminals and passes or receives coded messages
to and from other switching devices. A sponsored institution must
establish an individual relationship with a sponsoring chartered
member. The former can transmit and receive messages only
4For a general description of the system see "Coast to Coast Convenience" 2:3 Forum
(Canadian Payments Association, September, 1986).
45 Members of the Canadian Payments Association are the Bank of Canada, every bank,
every savings bank to which the Quebec Savings Banks Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-4 applies,
and other depositary financial institutions, such as a central co-operative credit society or
a trust company. See s. 4 of the Canadian Payments Association Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-
21 (hereafter "CPA Act"). Members must meet certain requirements as to financial
stability (s. 30).
46 According to Interac, at the end of December, 1988, there were 6,468 ABMs installed:
letter from Interac to the author (February 27, 1989). According to a recent published
ABM survey of distribution of terminals by province (as well as types of depositary
financial institution), at January 31, 1989, there were altogether 6,176 ABMs. See 5:1
Forum (Canadian Payments Association, March, 1989). As each financial institution
keeps installing ABMs, the total is a changing number.
47 The original 10 chartered members are: Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia,
Canadian Cooperative Credit Society, La Confederation des caisses populaires et
d'economie Desjardins du Quebec, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Canada
Trust, Laurentian Bank, National Bank, Royal Bank, and Toronto Dominion Bank. At
present there are eight sponsored members: Hong Kong Bank, National Trust, Royal
Trust, Caisses Acadienne, Caisses Ontario, Central Trust, Lloyds Bank, and Montreal
Trust. Source: letter from Interac to the author (February 27, 1989).
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through the latter's gateway. Some sponsored members act only as
card issuers.
Interac operates on the basis of online verification and authori-
zation. An immediate cardholder's account adjustment is not
necessarily an indispensable feature of the system. Each insti-
tution member is free either to act on a realtime basis or to delay
action by initially "memoposting" a transaction for an overnight
batch update.
Clearing and settlement for transactions exchanged through
Interac takes place in the framework of the national clearing and
settlement system run by the CPA.48 Chartered members must be
direct clearers. 49 Each charter member debits each other charter
member for the daily value of cash dispensed to the latter's
customers, including those of its sponsored member(s), at the
former's, as well as its sponsored member(s)' ABMs. The debits
are entered on the ACSS, and charter members' accounts are
adjusted at the Bank of Canada. 50 A sponsored member settles
with the charter member acting for it in a correspondent account.
An Interac transaction may thus involve up to four members:
two charter and two sponsored members. The charter member
which communicates either its own or its sponsored member's
authorization guarantees funds to the recipient charter member.
Whether funds are guaranteed to the recipient sponsored member
is a matter to be agreed upon between that institution and its
correspondent charter member.
Institutions which are neither chartered nor sponsored
members cannot send or receive payments in Interac. The
network exclusively serves Interac Association members.
48 Under the statutory authority "to establish and operate a national clearings and settle-
ments system" provided for by s. 5 of the CPA Act.
49 "Direct Clearer" is a CPA member that settles for items drawn on or payable by it
through a settlement account at the Bank of Canada. It must satisfy certain requirements
as to volume and must participate directly in the exchange of items at least at one regional
settlement point. "Indirect Clearer" settles through a settlement account with a "Direct
Clearer" acting as its Clearing Agent. See definitions in s. 1.01 of By-law No. 3 -
Clearing By-law, Can. Gaz., Part 1, Vol. 117, No. 3, January 15, 1983, made by the CPA
pursuant to authority under (what is now) s. 18(1)(d) (and possibly (e)) of the CPA Act.
At present (June, 1989), there are 15 Direct Clearers (7 of which do not currently act as
clearing agents for any other institution) and 129 Indirect Clearers (altogether 144 CPA
members). Membership statistics is according to a letter from CPA to the author (June 7,
1989).
50 ACSS stands for the Automated Clearing Settlement System. Its major functions are
logging, reconciling, balancing and reporting the daily exchanges of payment items in the
clearing. For an overview, see "Drawdowns and Redeposits", 2:3 Forum (Canadian
Payments Association, September, 1986).
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A different model for a shared ABM network is that of Cirrus
and of Plus. Each may operate as a cross border network in
Canada and the United States. Institution members communicate
through a central switch. Network architecture is not that of the
"direct central switch" variety. Communication from a terminal to
the central switch is intermediated by the host computer to which
the terminal is linked. The switch bank holds accounts for directly
connected institution members. Settlement is made at the switch
bank where accounts are adjusted daily. A Canadian bank may
use its U.S. office to transmit funds to the switch bank. Such a
network allows a Canadian cardholder to access his account via an
ABM of an American bank located in the United States, and
increasingly, in other parts of the world.
A universal national POS system exists in Australia. This is a
gateway system operated by the four large main trading banks.
Any other institution must establish an individual correspondent
relationship with a main trading bank. At present, institutions
other than the main trading banks participate solely as card
issuers. The main trading banks settle daily at the Reserve Bank.
A sponsored institution settles in its sponsoring main trading bank
in a correspondent account. The system operates in a full realtime
environment. It is premised on online authorization followed by
realtime debit and credit to cardholder's and merchant's
respective accounts.5"
The environment envisaged by the Canadian Payments Associ-
ation for POS transactions "is one in which Debit Cards and PINs,
whose issuance is controlled by CPA members, employing
magnetic stripe technology, are used to initiate on-line authori-
zation and realtime data capture". 5 2 Instantaneous account
adjustment is not required. A similar environment already exists
for ABM transactions.5 3 The overall framework for ABM a well as
for POS transactions is that of a "two tiered" gateway system.
Sponsoring institutions must be Direct Clearers which settle at the
51 For a brief reference to this structure see "Payments System Developments in Austra-
lia", Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin 1, July 4, 1988.
52 EFTPOS Fundamentals, supra, footnote 13, at p. 3. For the present experimentation in
Canada, along the lines described in the text which follows footnote 37, supra, see T.
Reiman, "Debut of the Debit Cards" (1989), 96 Canadian Banker 4:18.
53 For a blueprint, see ATM Report, supra, footnote 38, at pp. 5-6. The suggested scenario
refers to a debit in the cardholder's account as preceding the cash disbursement.
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Bank of Canada and are fully responsible for transactions of their
sponsored institutions .
4
4. Legal Framework for EFT Debit Card Transactions
There is no legislation in Canada governing debit card transac-
tions. Clearing arrangements and settlements fall into the sphere
governed by by-laws and rules made by the Canadian Payments
Association. 55 Contract governs the respective cardholder-bank,
merchant-bank, and cardholder-merchant relationships.
Interbank relationships may be governed by contract and network
rules. Apart from public law regulation, the rest is common law
which may supersede contractual provisions and apply to spheres
falling outside the reach of contract, that is, as between parties not
privy to a contract.
56
Pertinent common law rules may be derived from the law
applicable to the banker and customer relationship as well as from
principles applicable to consumer protection. They may further be
dependent on the classification of the debit card transaction into a
recognized category of payment mechanisms.
In general, payment mechanisms are either credit or debit trans-
fers. Where the payment instructions are communicated by the
paying party directly to this bank, there is a credit transfer. Where
the paying party's instructions are communicated to his own bank
via the payee, there is a debit transfer. In a credit transfer, the first
impact of the payment instructions is a debit to the paying party's
account. Funds are subsequently "pushed" to the payee. In a debit
transfer, the first impact of the payment instructions is a credit,
though usually provisional, to the payee's account. Funds are then
"pulled" from the paying party's account. 57
The cheque payment is a typical debit transfer. Having received
the cheque from the drawer, the payee deposits it in his own bank
and receives provisional credit. The cheque is then forwarded for
collection to the drawer's account from which funds are
"pulled".58
54 See in general EFT/POS and ABM documents, supra, footnotes 13 and 38 respectively.
55 CPA Act, ss. 18(1)(d) (and possibly (e)) and 19(1).
56 Whether CPA by-laws and rules may supersede common law or even statutory rules is
outside the scope of the present article.
57 See in general, B. Geva, "The Concept of Payment Mechanism" (1986), 24 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 1, at pp. 6-7.
58 For cheque clearing in Canada, see Geva, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 303-5.
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The wire payment is the example par excellence of a credit
transfer. It is initiated by the communication of payment instruc-
tions from the paying party to his bank. The latter debits the
former's account and "pushes" funds which are paid to the credit
of the payee's account.
59
The EFT debit card transaction does not lend itself easily to
such classification. Thus, in a POS payment, 60 instructions are
communicated to the paying party's bank via a terminal installed
by the merchant's bank at the merchant's place of business.
Except in the "direct central switch" design, communication to
the cardholder's bank is via the merchant's bank. This is consistent
with the channels of communication in a debit transfer. At the
same time, where the transaction is completed on a realtime basis,
the debit to the cardholder's account precedes the credit to the
merchant's account, as in a credit transfer. Otherwise, where only
online authorization but no realtime account adjustment is
involved, the sequence of credit and debit may vary. Where a
nonbank issuer verification is involved or in the case of a smart
card, credit will precede debit, as in a debit transfer.
In the final analysis, whenever the debit to the cardholder's
account is posted on the basis of online authorization and not in
response to the credit posted to the merchant's account, the POS
payment may be regarded as a credit transfer, regardless of the
actual sequence of the respective debit and credit. This analysis
distinguishes between the request made through the terminal
bank and the payment made by the paying party's bank. Stated
otherwise, in transmitting the cardholder's payment request to his
bank, in every configuration except the "direct central switch"
design (where it is not involved at all), the merchant's bank serves
as a mere messenger. Unlike in the cheque deposit, no provisional
credit is posted to the merchant's account. The account is only
credited upon receipt by the merchant's bank of the online author-
ization. The original online communication from the terminal
ought thus to be understood as instructions from the cardholder
directly to his bank which "pushes" funds to the merchant's
account. In this scenario no electronic deposit is involved and the
59 See in general, B. Geva, "The Evolving Law of Payment by Wire Transfer - An
Outsider's View of Draft UCC Article 4A" (1988), 14 C.B.L.J. 186, at p. 187.
60 The classification applies solely to third party payments. Hence, ABM cash disburse-
ments are excluded.
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online authorization is an indication of the existence of a credit
transfer.
On the other hand, whenever collection from the cardholder is
made by means of batch processing, which is always the case
where no online authorization exists, the POS payment is a debit
transfer. In such a case, credit is posted to the merchant's account
and funds are collected or "pulled" from the cardholder's bank.
Unfortunately, the proper categorization of an EFT debit card
transaction, either as a credit or debit transfer, does not bring with
it a comprehensive identifiable body of law automatically
applicable to all facets of the particular debit card payment.
Classification may assist us to bring and apply analogies. At the
same time, the technological components of a retail EFT system
may impact the legal regime in a way that is likely to supersede the
initial categorization.
The analysis which follows identifies the function served by each
participant in an EFT debit card transaction. Sources of law and
substantive applicable rules will then be examined in pertinent
interparticipant relationships.
Participants in an EFT debit card transaction may act in various
capacities:
61
1. Card Issuer: the institution that issues a card and controls the
PIN used to access the account.
2. Cardholder: a customer of the card issuer to whom the card
and PIN are issued by the card issuer.
3. Account holder: the institution that holds the cardholder's
deposit account to be accessed by means of the card.
4. Acceptor: the person operating the terminal at the point of
origin.
5. Acquirer: an institution which acquires the data relating to the
payment following its entry at the terminal at the point of
origin, then passes the data to the card issuer and communi-
cates back the latter's response in the form of either authori-
zation or rejection.
6. Intermediate Network Connector: an institution providing
communications pathways between the card issuer and the
acquirer.
61 The ensuing definitions draw on POS and ABM documents, supra, footnotes 13 and 38,
respectively.
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The following observations should be made about this defini-
tional framework:
1. In the environment envisaged by the CPA for Canada, the
card issuer must be the account holder.62 It ought to be a
depositary financial institution.
63
2. In a POS payment the acceptor is the merchant and the
acquirer is the merchant's bank. In an ABM cash
disbursement transaction, the acceptor is likely to be a depos-
itary financial institution.64 Where such an acceptor is a
network member, no separate acquirer exists.
3. In a proprietary network, the card issuer/account holder is the
same as the acquirer in POS payment, and the same as the
acceptor/acquirer in an ABM transaction.
4. An EFT debit card transaction in a shared network may
involve intermediate network connector(s). In the definitional
framework, the intermediate network connector is always a
depositary financial institution. Any other intermediary, such
as a communication carrier, is to be regarded as an agent of its
employer. 6
5
As indicated, clearing arrangements and settlements constitute
a sphere subject to by-laws and rules made by the Canadian
Payments Association. Contract and network rules govern all
aspects of interbank relationships not governed by CPA by-laws
and rules, including the positions of the operator of a central
switch, clearing house, or communication carrier. In general,
norms adopted by interbank contracts, network rules, and CPA
by-laws and rules are likely to be comprehensive and detailed.
Furthermore, interbank relationships are typically reciprocal and
are subject to an autonomous regime. Accordingly, general law
has little to say about interbank relationships.66
62 But this is not necessarily the case in the United States. See the paragraph which follows
the one containing footnote 27, supra.
63 For an explanation, see footnote 25 and the text around it. Two exceptions are recog-
nized. First, the issuer can be one related with the account holder such as a central co-
operative society. Second, as discussed in the paragraph preceding the last one in Part 1,
a depositary financial institution may provide (and control) a PIN to a card issued by a
retailer. In the context of the payment system, the bank ought to be regarded as the
issuer of the card. The two exceptions are thus more apparent than real.
64 That is in a depositary financial institution-operated system such as Interac. Cf. footnote
39, supra.
65 Cf. Geva, supra, footnote 59, at p. 212 (on Draft UCC Article 4A).
66 Except perhaps in relation to competition. Cf. B.R. Campbell, "The Competition Act -
The Special Case of Banks" (1986-87), 1 B.F. L. Rev. 225.
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Contract governs the cardholder-acceptor relationship.
However, so far as the debit card transaction is concerned, most
contract terms are likely to be implied and derived from the other
relationships whose regulation is quite detailed.
The merchant-acquirer and the cardholder-card issuer/account
holder relationships are governed by the law of banker and
customer. This branch of law focuses on the bank account and the
banker's responsibility in following the customer's instructions as
to incoming and outgoing funds to and from the account. In this
branch of law, common law rules are supplanted and even super-
seded by detailed contractual provisions. 67
The merchant-acquirer relationship is thus predominantly
contractual. However, it is not characterized by intensive
mutuality and is not autonomous in the same way as the interbank
relationship is. Hence, contractual terms may be subject to some
scrutiny. To some extent, the bargaining power of banks may be
offset by the combined power of retail organizations. In the final
analysis, the merchant-acquirer contractual relationship is not
immune from legal scrutiny. In practice, however, the scrutiny
may be quite minimal.
The cardholder-card issuer/account holder relationship is
governed by contract. In some countries it is also subject to a
detailed regulatory scheme which either supersedes or imposes
contract terms. In the United States it is done by statute68 and by
regulation.69 In New Zealand there is a binding Code of Practice
negotiated by the government. In Australia the banks voluntarily
abide by a set of procedures recommended by the government. 70
These procedures provide standards for the availability and
disclosure of terms and conditions applicable to the use of debit
cards, as well as to changing such terms and conditions; the availa-
bility of paper records and periodical statements for debit card
transactions; cardholder's liability for an unauthorized transac-
67 Recognition of the contractual nature of the banker-customer relationship goes back to
N. Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corp., [1921] 3 K.B. 110 (C.A.), at p. 127,per Atkin L.J.
68 Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C.S. (Supp., 1978), §§ 1693 et seq.
69 Regulation E, 12 C.F.R, Part 205.
70 The Australian perspective (with a reference to New Zealand as well) is set out by D.
Harland in "Developments in Electronic Funds Transfer Systems and the Consumer -
an Australian Perspective" (1989), 15 C.B.L.J. 259. The text of the Recommended
Procedures is reproduced in the Second Report of the Working Group Examining the
Rights and Obligations of the Users and Providers of Electronic Funds Transfer Systems
(Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986), pp. 32-44.
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tion; card issuer's liability in cases of technical malfunction; error
and dispute resolution procedures; deposits in electronic termi-
nals; inability of networking arrangements to deny cardholders
direct remedies against card issuers; audit trails; and privacy. No
regulatory scheme of any nature exists in Canada. As a result, the
cardholder-card issuer/account holder relationship remains
predominantly contractual.
71
Five contentious consumer protection areas relating to the
cardholder's position have been identified. They are disclosure
and billing practices, countermand of payment, liability for
unauthorized use of the card, recovery of loss resulting from
communication breakdown, and dispute resolution.
Disclosure and billing practices are traditional concerns of
consumer protection legislation. These concerns are not unique to
debit card transactions and have long been recognized in the credit
cards area.
As for countermand of payment, it is almost universally
accepted that once authorization is given, or at least communi-
cated to the terminal, a debit card payment to a merchant cannot
be countermanded. Similarly, any debit card payment with
respect to which the NSF risk is assumed by the card issuer ought
to be irrevocable. No such certainty exists in relation to a debit
card payment for which the card issuer only guarantees authen-
ticity of the card use, that is, provides verification alone. In
principle, such payments ought to be countermandable until
collection, exactly like cheque payments are. 72 However, no
specific legislation covers it.
On a policy level, one may raise the question whether even an
irrevocable debit card payment ought not to be subject to charge-
back powers in a specified set of circumstances, as for example
where there is a dispute between the cardholder and the merchant.
No regulation to that effect is known to me in the debit card area.
73
In general, such a scheme would be inconsistent with the finality of
the debit card payment, that is, to its assimilation to payment in
cash.
The third point, that of liability for unauthorized use, 74 may be
71 See in general A. Chant,"The Automated Teller Machine - A New Consumer Bank
Relationship" (1986-87), 1 B.F. L. Rev. 99
72 Under s. 167(a) of the Bills of Exchange Act.
73 This is unlike the credit card area: see, e.g., s. 170 of the federal Fair Credit Billing Act of
1974,15 U.S.C.S. (1975), § 1666i.
74 In general, and without purporting to define the term comprehensively, "unauthorized
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regarded as the most contentious. So far as a card issuer is
concerned, the insertion of the card at the terminal, accompanied
by entering the correct PIN, is a valid authentication of the
payment instructions subsequently given. Since prudence requires
that the PIN should not be recorded by the cardholder on the card
or next to it, any knowledge by an unauthorized user of the PIN
must have come from the cardholder, either willingly or by negli-
gence. This reasoning leads to the allocation of losses incurred by
the unauthorized use to the cardholder. There is however a broad
consensus today that even assuming cardholder's responsibility
notice given to the card issuer of the loss or theft of the card should
block the possibility of subsequent use of the card. Accordingly,
loss incurred by virtue of unauthorized use subsequent to the
notice ought to be borne by the card issuer.
However, consumer advocates question whether the mere
existence of unauthorized use is necessarily the cardholder's fault.
Some question reliability of bank handling procedures of PIN
information as well as the level of integrity of bank systems.75 A
more broadly shared conviction is that if fault is to determine
responsibility, the bank's behavior must also be taken into
account. Sophisticated crime may be facilitated by bank negli-
gence. Moreover, the mere ability of a stanger to learn a PIN by
observing the dialling pattern of a cardholder may be the result of
a defective terminal design.
Consumer advocates also argue that losses created by a sophisti-
cated criminal victimizing an innocent cardholder cannot be
attributed to the latter's fault and ought to be fully absorbed by
banks as better risk bearers. One such case is that of obtaining the
card by false pretence from an unsuspecting cardholder by a
criminal who has learned the PIN by observing the dialling pattern
of the cardholder. 76 Another case is the installation of a bogus
terminal. 7
7
use" corresponds to the use of a stolen card by an unlawful possessor. In fact, there is the
additional problem, not discussed here, of use in excess of authority.
75 For allegations of "robotic thefts", that is "episodes involving the erroneous debiting of
cards in apparently inexplicable circumstances", in the early days of ATMs in the United
Kingdom, see M. Karmel, "Procedure and Evidence: The Maintenance of Transaction
Records: Proving the State of Account in EFT Transactions", in R.M. Goode, ed.,
Electronic Banking (London, Institute of Bankers and Centre for Commercial Law
Studies of Queen Mary College, 1985), at pp. 50-1, quoting from the National Consumer
Council's 1983 report on banking services and the consumer.
76 See, e.g., Ognibene v. Citibank, N.A., 446 N.Y.S. 2d 845, (N.Y. City, Civ. Ct., 1981);
State of New York v. Citibank, 537 F. Supp. 1192 (D.C., S.D., N.Y., 1982).
77 "A bogus terminal is an unauthorized card-accepting device and PIN entry device used
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In the final analysis, consumer advocates challenge altogether
the application of fault notions to the determination of
cardholder's exposure. First, they argue, litigating negligence
issues with respect to relatively small amounts may lead to gross
inefficiency. Second, human shortcomings are not to be
overlooked even in the electronic age. Thus, they argue, some
cardholders are bound to be forgetful and sloppy in handling PIN
information. Banks ought to treat losses created thereby as part of
the costs of the electronic revolution and be willing to absorb
them. In fact, the argument continues, the allocation of fraud
losses to banks would provide them with further inducement78 to
improve security and identification procedures7 9 and thereby
reduce losses altogether. A variant of this school of thought would
be prepared to fasten on the customer liability for a relatively
small amount out of the initial loss up to notification as an
incentive for better card and PIN protection as well as prompt loss
notification.
Solutions to the problem of unauthorized use vary. They reflect
different compromises between competing approaches. The
American statutory solution is the most favourable to consumers.
The cardholder's exposure is limited either to $50 or to $500,
depending on the time when the card issuer is notified of the loss of
the card. 80 Exposure extends solely for loss from unauthorized use
occurring prior to notification of the loss to the card issuer. These
limits exist irrespective of the cardholder's negligence in
for fraudulent purposes to capture card information and a customer's PIN. This inform-
ation can then be used to manufacture a fraudulent card, which in conjunction with the
correct PIN, could then be used to access a customer's account". See EFTPOS Consul-
tative Process, supra, footnote 13, at p. 16.
78 Indeed, loss minimization may be high on the agenda of banks under any regime for the
allocation of unauthorized use losses, if for marketing purposes alone.
79 Alternatives to PIN technology capable of identifying an individual user which are
currently known include voice or photograph recognition systems, fingerprint or
handprint verification, and signature dynamics (where the characteristics of the signature
are digitized and stored for comparison in the computer system). All are technologically
feasible though not necessarily cost effective. As well, they may be perceived as a threat
to cardholders' privacy. See, J.V. Vergari and V.V. Shue, Checks, Payments and
Electronic Banking (New York, Practising Law Institute, 1986), pp. 542-3.
80 Reg. E., supra, footnote 69, § 205.6. Exposure is unlimited only for unauthorized
transfers which follow the failure to notify earlier unauthorized transfers that appear in a
periodic statement.
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maintaining PIN secrecy, but not where the cardholder furnished
the wrongdoer the "means of access" to the account.
81
The Australian Recommended Procedures limit the
cardholder's exposure to $50 prior to notification of the loss,
provided the cardholder has not contributed to the loss, as for
example, by failing to maintain PIN secrecy. 82 The Canadian
contractual position is not uniform. Under one standard contract,
consumer exposure extends to the amount of the actual loss
incurred by the unauthorized use up to notification. Under
another, it is limited to $50 up to notification, though subject to
PIN confidentiality being maintained by the cardholder.
83
The fourth point, that of the cardholder's right to recover for
loss resulting from communication breakdown, raises the question
of liability for consequential loss. The Australian Recommended
Procedures allow recovery for consequential damage except
where "the cardholder should have been aware that the system or
equipment was unavailable for use or malfunctioning". 8 4 In
principle, American common law recognizes liability for
foreseeable consequential loss resulting from interbank communi-
cation breakdown. 85 This exposure will be eliminated in noncon-
sumer wire payments if UCC Article 4A becomes law. 86
The final contentious issue relates to dispute resolution. Two
separate questions arise. The first involves access to justice due to
economies of scale. Many disputes are likely to involve amounts
that are too small to justify legal costs. At the same time, the
potential for aggravation and ill feeling is quite enormous.
Second, there is a serious question about the onus of proof. Does
the bank computer printout indicating an authenticated card use
constitute prima facie evidence of such use? How can such
evidence be challenged by an aggrieved consumer alleging
unauthorized use, and how can he prove maintenance of complete
confidentiality as to the PIN? In Judd v. Citibank 7 a cardholder
81 According to Ognibene, supra, footnote 76, at pp. 847-8, "means of access" include the
card and the PIN.
82 Sec. 5.5 of the Recommended Procedures, supra footnote 70.
83 This is based on Chant, supra, footnote 71, at p. 102 and Appendix. No independent
survey has been made in connection with this article.
84 Section 6.2 of the Recommended Procedures, supra, footnote 70.
85 Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F. 2d 951 (7th Cir., 1982), revg 522 F. Supp. 820
(D.C. N.D. Ill., 1981).
86 See Geva, supra, footnote 59, at pp. 223-4.
87 435 N.Y.S. 2d 210 (N.Y. City, Civ. Ct., 1980).
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sued her bank for the return of moneys allegedly charged to her
account erroneously. Bank computer printouts documenting cash
withdrawals were met by the cardholder's alibi as to all relevant
times. She further testified that the card had always been in her
possession and that she had maintained complete PIN confiden-
tiality. The court held in her favour and "[was] not prepared to go
so far as to rule that where a credible witness is faced with the
adverse testimony of a machine, he is as a matter of law faced also
with an unmeetable burden of proof'. Taking into account "the
tales of computer malfunctions that we hear daily" and the
testimony of the bank's own witness confirming "physical
malfunctions of the very system in issue", the court held for the
cardholder. 88 Nevertheless, the question cannot be considered as
being finally resolved along these lines. 89
Contract law is quite inadequate in explaining the position of
the cardholder or the merchant against an institution90 other than
his own respective bank. Indeed, a transmittal error as well as the
failure to communicate either a payment request or positive verifi-
cation/authorization may be attributed to technical malfunction or
any other factor which may happen to be outside the control of a
bank with which the party at loss is in privity. Under those circum-
stances, may the merchant sue such parties as the card issuer or an
intermediate network connector? May the cardholder sue parties
such as the acceptor, acquirer or an intermediate network
connector? Alternatively, is the merchant limited to an action
against the acquirer, and may the cardholder sue only the card
issuer?
The common law has not answered these questions with great
precision. Indeed, in a debit transfer, an intermediary bank is an
agent of the bank of deposit. 91 In a credit transfer, an intermediate
transmitting bank is an agent of the originating bank. It was held in
England, in the latter context, that the paying customer may not
sue the intermediate transmitting bank. That is, a principal may
88 Ibid., at p. 212.
89 For example, the cardholder's testimony as to circumstances surrounding the use of the
card was not accepted in Feldman v. Citibank, 443 N.Y.S. 2d 43 (N.Y. City, Civ. Ct.,
1981).
90 As well as against the switch, any intermediate clearing facility, or a communication
carrier.
91 Cf. in general, Barclays Bank plc. v. Bank of England, [1985] 1 All E.R. 385 at p. 392,
per Bingham J.: paying bank as a subagent of the presenting bank in a cheque collection.
(Vol. 15
The EFT Debit Card 437
not recover directly from a subagent employed by his own (the
principal's) agent. 92 The contrary view has prevailed in the United
States.
93
The better view appears to be the one limiting the number of
potential defendants. That is, except for when bank insolvency is
involved, no policy is served by allowing a bank customer, be it the
cardholder or the merchant, to sue a bank other than his own.
Among themselves banks may set their own rules designed to
assign liability to the bank at fault. This should be of no concern to
the customer who has suffered loss. Needless to say, such a
scheme presupposes two conditions. First, that banks are not
allowed to disclaim liability by contract for fault of their own or for
the fault of other network participants. Second, rules of evidence
must assist a plaintiff-customer suing his bank on the basis of an
occurrence for which another bank is responsible. Thus, in the
final analysis, liability for communication breakdown and inter-
ruption may require legislation.
Another area involving no direct contractual privity is that of
the verification/authorization communication. Is the acceptor/-
merchant entitled to the benefit of this communication and can he
fasten liability on the card issuer, on the intermediate network
connector, or only on the acquirer? Does liability depend on the
chain of communication as determined by each network
configuration? Under theories of collateral warranties as well as of
liability for negligent statements, avenues of recovery may also be
constructed against parties not in contractual privity. 94 At the
same time, in the context of the EFT debit card transaction, each
bank's liability is discharged by payment along settlement lines
and not directly to the merchant, even as the beneficiary of the
promises under the verification/authorization. Except for the
"direct central switch" design, the gains from other sources of
liability, besides that of the acquirer, are far from clear. Still, in all
configurations, are intermediate connectors more than conduits
for messages? Does the acquirer guarantee payment prior to
receiving settlement?
92 Royal Products Ltd. v. Midland Bank, [1981] 2 LI. L. Rep. 194 (Q.B.). See also Geva,
supra, footnote 59, at pp. 190-1 and references there.
93 Evra, supra, footnote 85.
94 See, e.g., Shanklin Pier Ltd. v. Detel Products Ltd., [1951] 2 K.B. 854 (collateral
warranty); Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.)
(negligent statement).
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No obvious answers exist. The common law may provide a
framework for dealing with these questions. However, legislation
is likely to provide a more comprehensive and carefully tailored
solution.
Finally, issues concerning discharge and time of payment ought
to be considered.
To begin with, the reliability and the operationability of a POS
system ought not to be warranted by either party to a POS
payment. Stated otherwise, the failure to complete a POS
payment due to system failure should not be regarded as a breach
of contract by either cardholder or merchant. Upon such a failure,
an alternative mode of payment ought to be pursued, failing which
a fully executory transaction ought to be cancelled. Loss
generated by either side may be recoverable from his respective
bank.95
Once a POS payment is carried out so that a confirmation is
obtained at the terminal, what are the respective rights of the
cardholder and merchant? Has the cardholder been discharged,
either conditionally or absolutely? What are the merchant's rights
and against whom? The law governing these questions has not so
far been fully developed. 96 The following is a tentative outline
setting out a proposed optimal model.
The receipt at the terminal of a confirmation of a guaranteed
debit card payment generates an absolute discharge of the
cardholder's indebtedness to the merchant. When the acquirer
receives settlement for the guaranteed debit card payment, its
amount becomes part of the funds in the merchant's bank account
and any claim to it as a separate item is fully discharged. Whether
the merchant stands in a similar position even earlier, by obtaining
an absolute right but exclusively against the acquirer, is a question
yet to be resolved. The determination of this issue depends on the
merchant's position towards the authorization originating from
the card issuer. 97 Is he entitled to its benefit? Until what point? Is
this entitlement affected by such circumstances as bank failure?
The receipt at the terminal of a nonguaranteed debit card
payment generates a conditional discharge of the cardholder's
95 For bank liability for communication breakdown see the paragraph containing footnotes
84 to 86, supra.
96 For a credit card payment as an absolute discharge of the cardholder's indebtedness to
the merchant, see Re Charge Card Services Ltd., [198813 W.L. R. 764 (C.A.).
97 As discussed in text around footnote 94, supra.
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indebtedness to the merchant. The item is then deposited by the
merchant to his account at the acquirer for collection from the
card issuer/account holder. A provisional credit may be posted to
the merchant's account upon deposit. It firms up upon the
obtainment of settlement by the acquirer. In principle, a nonguar-
anteed card payment is the equivalent of a cheque payment. 98 It is
thus governed by similar rules. 99
5. Conclusion
In a historical process which started with coins and bank notes
and continued with cheques and credit cards, the EFT debit card is
the newest method of retail payment. 10 It is likely to expand
primarily as a mode of payment to retailers who normally do not
accept credit cards, such as grocers, as well as among some
consumers. Such consumers may not qualify to receive credit
cards. Others hold credit cards but prefer to use them selectively
in order not to exhaust available credit lines or for any other
reason. In retail transactions, the debit card is capable of serving
as cash. It is considerably more sophisticated than the bank note
or the coin, but is nevertheless not subject to a comprehensively
developed body of law.10'
In selecting the appropriate avenue for the development of
debit card law two extremes should be avoided. First, there is no
need to rush in with a detailed statute that, by being geared solely
to existing technology, may arrest development. Flexibility is an
important feature to be retained in this area of law. Second, the
case by case process of the common law may be too slow to be
trusted in such a fast-moving area.
In substantive matters, the by-law and rule-making power of the
CPA is limited to the operation of the national clearing and
settlement system.'0 2 However, the association is also entrusted
with a statutory mandate "to plan the evolution of the national
payments system". 0 3 Needless to say, such a mandate can be
98 Though with one enhancement, that is the card authentication serving as the verification
of the cardholder's authority.
99 This does not ensure certainty. For an effective return of a dishonoured cheque after the
time permitted under clearing rules, see National Slag v. C.I.B.C. (1982), 140 D.L.R.
(3d) 473 (Ont. H.C.J.), affd 19 D.L.R. (4th) 383n (C.A.).
100 For this observation see Chorafas, supra, footnote 2, at p. 294.
101 Ibid., at pp.336-7.
102 See ss. 18 and 19 of the CPA Act. Other enumerated items relate to the administration
of the association itself.
103 CPA Act, s. 5.
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carried out successfully only as a genuinely co-operative effort
between the CPA and its member depositary financial institutions
on the one hand, and the other participants in the payment system
(such as retailers and consumers) on the other. In fact, a co-
operative process is well underway. It should produce an agreed
set of rules and terms to be introduced in standard form agree-
ments. It should also generate interbank rules and practices in
areas not exclusively limited to clearing and settlement. The
process is thus a welcome development.
Whether a CPA dominated process is the most appropriate
broadly based framework to generate consensus on the rules
applicable to debit cards, and whether other government depart-
ments, such as Consumer and Corporate Affairs ought not to
participate, are questions outside the scope of this article. Further-
more, it remains to be seen whether the outcome of any voluntary
process will eliminate the need for compulsory regulation. None
the less, any proposed scheme should not bypass but be the culmi-
nation of such a process, taking into account and building on what
has been achieved through it.
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